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ABSTRACT
The vast majority of Individual Retirement Account
contributions represent net new saving, based on evidence from the
quarterly Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES). The results are
based on analysis of the relationship between IRA contributions
and other financial asset saving. The data show almost no
substitution of IRAs for other saving. While the core of the
paper is based on cross—section analysis, important use is made of
the CES panel of independent cross-sections that span the period
during which IRAs were introduced. Estimates for the post 1982
period, when IRAs were available to all employees, are based on a
flexible constrained optimization model, with the IRA limit the
principle constraint. The implications of this model for saving
in the absence of the IRA option match very closely the actual
non—IRA financial asset saving behavior prior to 1982. IRA saving
does not show up as other financial asset saving in the pre—IRA
period.
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HAVE IRAS INCREASED U.S.SAVING?: EVIDENCE FROM CONSUMEREXPENDITURE SURVEYS
by
Steven F. Ventj and DavidA. Wise
Individual retirementaccounts (IRA5) have becomean
immensely popular and importantform of saving in the United
States since 1982, whenthey became available to allemployees.
Any employee could Contribute$2000 per year to an IRAaccount and
a non—working Spouse ofan employee $250. Totalcontributions to
these tax deferredsaving plans were $5 billion in1981, $28
billion in 1982, and willbe about $45 billion in1986 or roughly
one—fourth of all personalsaving. The net saving effectof these
Contributions is the subjectof this paper.
Possibly the most contentious issuein the recent tax(1986)
reform discussions was thetreatment of IRAs. While theearlier
proposals Suggested substantialincreases in the formerlimits,
the Senate version of thebill would have eliminatedthe tax
deductibility of all contributionsand left the limitsunchanged.
The final bill leavesthe limits as they were butphases out the
tax deductibilIty ofcontributions for familiesearning over
$40,000 and singlepersons earning over $25,000.
Two empirical questionsplayed a central role in the
discussions: one was the incomelevels of IRA users, thesecond
was the net effect of IRAson saving, the extent to whichthey
were simply a substitute forother forms of saving. Basedon the—2—
reports of a few experts, itbecame the conventional wisdom among
many that the majorityof IRA contributions were made bythe
wealthy. This is factuallyincorrect; 90 percent of contributions
are made by individuals earningless than $50,000 per year and 70
percent of contributions byfamilies earning less than this
amount. The likelihood of contributingis much greater for high
than low income persons, however.It also became conventional
wisdom among many that the net savingeffect was negligible, again
based on the speculation of a few experts.The saving effect,
however, is a much more difficultquestion to answer than the
distribution of contributions by income.The much publicized
decline in the U.S. saving rate gives particularsignificance to
this question. Indeed, one of the primarymotivations for the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, thatextended the availability
of IRAs to all employees, was to increasesaving.
The approach of the paper is to compareindividual IRA
contributions with changes in other formsof saving, in particular
liquid financial assets. To theextent that IRAs are funded by
transfers from previously accumulated assets,or are a substitute
for new saving that would have taken place anyway,other financial
assets are the most likely source of funds,at least in the short
run. It is important to keepin mind that the question is not
where the money was taken from at thetime the IRA contribution
was made. Because most peopledon't carry $2000 in cash, when
asked where the money for an iRAcontribution came from, they may
respond that it came from a savingaccount, for example. But this—3—
is not an indication of thenet saving effect. Rather the issue
is what would have happenedto the money in the savingaccount had
it not been used to make theIRA contribution.
We Concluded in previous work(Venti and Wise [1986a,
1986bfl, based on data available at thattime, that only a very
small proportion of IRA contributionscould have been funded by
substitution of one form ofsaving for another. Those datawere
from the 1983 Survey of ConsumerFinances (SCF). While that
survey provided data on IRA contributions, itprovided only
qualitative information on associatedchanges in other financial
assets, whether they were positiveor negative. The analysis in
this paper is based on ConsumerExpenditure Surveys (CESs) for the
period 1980 through the firstquarter of 1984. These data provide
not only accurate informationon contributions to IRA accounts,
but also associated dollarchanges in other asset balances, such
as conventional saving accounts.In addition, through independent
quarterly cross sections, they provideaggregate time series
evidence on IRA contributions andother saving, although there is
no time series data on thesame individual that is useful forour
purposes.
I.Background and Dscriptjve Data
A.The Incentive Effects of IRAs
The widespread promotion of IRAsmay have been the most
important reason for theiruse. The advertisement has typically—4—
emphasized the avoidance of current taxes throughIRA
contributions, as well as the importance of prudent planningfor
retirement. They are available through almost any bankand
through many other financial institutions.
Two aspects of IRAs provide a more traditionaleconomic
incentive to save through their use: one is that thecontribution
itself is tax deductible, the other is that the interest onthe
contribution accumulates tax free, with taxes paid only whenfunds
are withdrawn from the account. A dollar ofcurrent consumption
foregone and deposited in a conventionalaccount would yield
exp[r(l—t)T] after T years at an interest rate rand marginal tax
rate t, if the marginal tax rate does not changewith age. A
dollar of foregone consumption placed in an IRA accountwould
yield l/(l-t)exp(rT](l-t) =exp[rT].Thus the ratio of the IRA to
the conventional yield would be exp[rtT], increasingwith the
interest rate, the marginal tax rate, and the number of yearsthat
the funds are left in the account. For example, at r =.1,
t =.3,and T =40,the ratio is 3.32. If T =20the ratio is
1.82 and at T =10it is 1.35, at the same r and t. If $2000 were
placed in an IRA account each year beginning at age 25,the after
tax value of the account by age 65 would be $789,000; placedin a
conventional saving account, the value would be only $320,000.
Some persons may also benefit from lower tax rateswhen funds are
withdrawn than when they are deposited.
On the other hand, once money is placed in an IRAaccount
there is a ten percent penalty for withdrawal beforethe age of 59—5—
and 1/2. In thissense, the IRA is less liquid thana
conventional account. If fundsare to be withdrawn beforeage 59
1/2, whether it would be betterto save the money inan IRA or a
conventional account againdepends on r, t, and T. Theyield from
the two accounts would bethe same at T =in[(it)/(l-t-l))/rt
For example, at r.1 and t =.3,T is 5.14 years. it is25.68
years at r =.02and t =.3.Thus to the extent thatthese
considerations are important,the incentive to savethrough IRAs
because of their higherreturn should be greater forpersons in
higher tax brackets, and thedisincentive because theyare less
liquid should be less thehigher the tax bracket.
Some persons of coursemay consider the illiquidity ofIRAs
an advantage; it mayhelp to ensure behavior thatwould not
otherwise be followed. itmay be a means of self—control. The
fact that theopportunity is lost if a contribution isnot made in
the current yearmay serve the same purpose. Onecannot, as with
conventional saving, put itoff--possibly a self delusion-—untli
the next year.1
In addition, because of thehigher return on IRAs, to achieve
any given level of retirement income
requires less saving if funds
are placed in an IRA accountthan if they are placed ina
1One might, forexample, have a scheme in which the limitfor the current year is addedto next year's limit ifa contribution is not made in thecurrent year. Or, the contributionlimit could cumulate more generallyover time if contributionsare not made during some period.—6—
conventional account. For example, againat r =.1and t =.3,to
achieve a million dollars in retirementsaving at age 65 would
mean giving up $4,377 per yearcurrent consumption, beginning at
age 25, if saving werethrough a conventional account,but only
$1,775 if saving were through anIRA. This "income" effect raises
the possibility that there couldin fact be less saving with than
without IRAs.
The effect of IRAs on savingis the net result of all of
these factors, including their promotion,and it is thus important
to choose an empirical specification
that allows each to be
reflected in the estimation of theirsaving effects. It may be
tempting to think of IRAs andconventional saving accounts as
equivalent assets, or goods, simplywith different prices, in
which case one might think of IRAs as onlya price subsidy of
conventional saving with a limit on the quantitythat can be had
at the subsidized price. But tothe extent that consumers treat
them as different assets or goods——possiblYbecause one is
intended for retirement and the otherfor short term saving or
because one is less liquid than theother--and to the extent that
the promotion has influenced their use,this view will not yield
an adequate representation orforecast of the saving effect of
IRAs. Indeed, the subsequent analysisindicates quite strongly
that the two are not treated as equivalentby consumers.
B. Descriptive Data
The Consumer Expenditure Surveys are nowconducted every
thi-ee months with a new cohort offamilies entering each quarter—7—
and with each familysurveyed for five consecutivequarters.2 For
the purposes of thisanalysis, self—employedpersons who are not
eligible for IRAs have beenexcluded from thesample.
The percent of familiesthat made IRA contributionsis shown
in table 1 for thefirst nine quartersafter all employeesbecame
eligible. The dataare presented for twoperiods, five quarters
in the first andfour in the second.We refer to themas the
first and second
years respectively. Thepercents pertain to all
ofthe respondents in thequarterly surveys for eachperiod taken
together.3 Thepercent that contributedincreased substantially
betweenthe first and secondyears in each income interval.In
addition, the percentContributing increases sharplywith income,
from 3 or 4 percent inthe lowest to 50or 60 percent in the
highest income interval.
Nonetheless, the vast majorityof
contributing families havefamily incomes less than$50,000, 74
percent in the first and 70percent jfl second year. About90
percent of individualcontributors have incomesless than this
amount.
Overall about 16percent of the secondyear respondents
ContributedIt is shown below thatmost Americans in thepast
2Thesurvey is weighted torepresent the national urban population.
3me IRA data isbased on responses to thequestion: "During thepast12 months, did Ethehousehold unit] placeany money in a self-employed retirement plansuch as an IndividualRetirement Account (IRA andKeogh)?" and "If yes —Howmuch?"
4See Venti andWise [1985].—8—
have saved very little, exceptin the form of housing; theyhave
virtually no financial assets.The 16 percent should be
interpreted in this light. Nowapproximately 20 percent oftax
filers contribute to iRAsand some reports indicatethat about 30
percent of filers haveaccounts.
The aggregate relationshipbetween iRA contributionsand
other personal financial savingover time is shown intable 2. It
shows iRA contributionsand additions to otherfinancial asset
balances among respondentsto each of the quarterly surveys
between the first quarterof 1980 and the first quarterof 1984.
While the percent making IRA
contributions increased from 2 or 3
percent to 17 or 18 percent,the percent with an increasein other
asset balances shows no trendat all, whether stocks andbonds are
included or excluded.5 The meanlevel of other saving alsoshows
little trend, but because ofoutliers in the data, the averages
5'rhe data in the table come from twosets of questions in the
CESs. The first asked: "Duringthe past 12 months, did ...place
any money in aself—employed retirement plansuch as Individual
Retirement Account (IRA & Keogh)?"and "If yes -Howmuch?" The
second set asked: "How does theamount your consumer unithad on
the last day of (last month) comparewith the amount your consumer
unit had on the last day of (lastmonth, one year ago) in—"and
"If more or less -Howmuch more (less)?" in:
a. Savings accountsin banks, savings and loans,credit
unions, and similar accounts.
b. Checking accounts, brokerage
accounts, and other similar
accounts.
c. U.S. Saving Bonds.
d. Securities such as stocks,mutual funds, private bonds,
government bonds, or treasurynotes."
Other financial assets excludingstocks and bonds is
comprised of a,b, and c.Other financial assetsincluding stocks
and bonds includes d as well.—9—
fluctuate widely from quarter to quarter. For this reason the
percent with an increase has been shown in the table.6 A simple
regression of the average of other financial saving onaverage IRA
contributions, and time, yields essentially a zero coefficienton
the IRA variable (.076 with a t-ratio of .117) when stocksand
bonds are excluded.7 Thus despite very large increases in IRA
contributions over this period, there seems onaverage to have
been no noticeable reduction in saving in other financial asset
forms.
A summary of the saving behavior of IRA contributorscompared
to non—contributors is shown in table 3. It shows thepercent of
IRA contributors with an increase in other saving compared to the
percent of non—contributors with an increase. The percent with an
increase in other saving is almost invariably higheramong
contributors. Thus it is not possible to see in these dataa
tradeoff between IRAs and other saving. Rather the datasuggest
an individual specific saving effect with those that save in one
form also more likely to save in other forms as well. The
analysis below will show that this is largely explained by
differences in measured variables likeage and education, with
little correlation between unmeasured determinants of IRA saving
and saving in other forms.
6The median is not used because it is almostalways zero; a
large number of respondents report no change in asset balances.
7when stocks and bonds are included the coefficient is.769
with a t-ratio of .706.—10—
To put in perspective the magnitude of IRA contributions, it
is helpful to have in mind the level of other asset balances. The
median of all financial assets, including stocks and bonds, was
$1125, based on the 1982:1 through 1984:1 panels. The median
excluding stocks and bonds was $1000. Because of an oversightin
the coding of collected data, it is not possible to calculate the
equity value of housing for CES respondents, and thus thereis no
measure of nonliquid wealth, which is largely housing. The
approximate level of nonliquid wealth of CES respondents can be
inferred, however, from such data collected in the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances. The median level of all financial assets among
respondents to that survey was $1300. The median of total wealth
was $22,900, the large majority of which was housing.8 Thesedata
confirm the low personal saving of American households documented
by others.9 Thus financial asset balances, and even total wealth,
are very low compared to the potential accrual from a $2000 or
more annual IRA contribution.
If, as table 3 shows, IRA contributors save more in all forms
than non—contributors, one would expect them to have accumulated
8See Venti and Wise {l986a, l986b]. Although the overall
medians in the SCF and the CESs are approximately the same, the
medians for the 50-100 thousand and the 100 thousand plus income
groups are substantially larger according to theSCF--about
$20,000 and $36,0000 respectively for all financial
assets,including stocks and bonds. We do not know the reason for
the difference in the two surveys, but the sample sizes of high
income families are quite small in both.
9See for example Hurd and Shoven [1983], Diamond and Hausman
[1984], and Kotlikoff [1984).—11—
larger asset balances.Table 4 confirms this.But even among IRA
Contributors, other financialasset balances arerelatively low.
It is clear thatmost contributors havenot beenaccumulating
financial assets ata rate close to thepotential from the maximum
family contribution toan IRA. The averagecontribution of IRA
Contributor familjes-—$2048in the 1982:1 to1984:1 period—-is
large relative to pastsaving.
II. he StatisticalModel
The spirit of thestatistical analysis isto consider the
relationship between IRAcontributions and othersaving,
recognizing the effect of theIRA limit, allowingfor flexible
substitution between IRAand other forms ofsaving, and Using a
specification that iscommensurate with the crosssection nature
of the availabledata. it is importantthat the analysisallow
for the Possibility
that individuals behaveas if the two forms of
saving were different"goods," but at the same timereveal them to
be perfect Substitutesif they are treatedthat way by
individuals. Forpurposes of exposition,we begin with a simple
sty1ize version of themodel to introduce themain features of
the approach. Thenthe details of theestimated model are set
forth.
A. Simp1e llustratjon
Because only crosssection data areavailable, we consider
the allocation ofcurrent Income Y to IRAsaving s1, to other—12—
forms of financial assetsaving S2, and to other usesC. The
budget constraint is C =Y-S
-s2,ignoring for the momentthe
tax advantages of IRAs.We need first to determinespecifications
for saving functions thatfit unconstrained choices of S1and S2.
Then we select a decisionfunction V that is consistentwith these
saving functions. And finally,using this decision function,we
determine saving functions S2for persons who areconstrained by
the upper limit on S1. Inthis way the constrained and
unconstrained S2 functional forms areconsistent with each other.
Suppose thatunconstrained i and s2 choices arematched by
the relationships S1 =abYand S2 =(l-a)bY,where b is the
portion of income savedand a is the portion of savingthat is
allocated to s1. This formulationis chosen to allow easy
comparison with the estimatedmodel. The decision functionthat




The two forms of saving areallowed to be treated asdistinct
alternatives since one is relativelyilliquid and presumably
intended for retirement whilethe other is more liquidand may be
intended for more short term purposes.In our case, the levelof
S1 is limited bythe maximum L and thechoice of S2 will depend on
whether the choice of 1 isconstrained by itslimit)0 We now
-°General discussions of demand withrationing are found in
Deaton [1981] and in Deatonand !4uellbauer [1981).—13—
let S and S2 represent unconstrained"desired" levels of saving






((l—a)bY if S1 <L
S2=
L[(1—a)b/(l—ab)J(y-L) if S1 >L.
The last line is the optimal choice of2' according to equation
(1), given that S1 =L.Suppose finally that the desired levels
S1 and 2 are determined in part by random disturbancese1 and e2.
Assume that they are additive so thatS1 =abY+e1and





(1—a)bY +e2 if S1 <L
=
I (1—a)b (l—a)b (Y-L) + e1+e2 if S1 >L (1—ab) (1—ab)—14—
Stylized versions of these functions are graphedin figure 1. The
constrained choice of S2 is sometimes denoted by S2, andthe
income at which it becomes effective byY. The last line in (3)
* isobtained by writing S2 as
S2 =(l_a)bY*+[(1_a)b/(l_ab)](Y_Y*)÷ e2,
and substituting Y =(L-e1)/ab,from S1 =abY*+el=L.The




In the subsequent analysis, parameters analagous to aand b
are parameterized as functions of individualcharacteristics like
age. In this sense, the model maybe thought of as the reduced
form of a more structural life cycle model. For our purposes,
however, the individual characteristics areused only to predict a
and b for different families.
To describe the effect of IRAs on saving, havingestimated




if the IRAlimitL were increased. Inparticular, what would
savings have been duringthe period of estimationhad the limit
been higher? itwould have had no effecton those not constrained
by the existing limit.Persons at the limitwould increase their
IRA contributionsby one dollar if the limit
were increased by one
dollar, i.e., ds1/dL =1.They would also reduce other
saving by
dS2*/dL(l-a)b/(1—ab). Moregenerally, the effect ofany limit
increase can be determinedby simulation. Givenpredicted a and
b, and e1 ande2 randomly chosen from theirestimated
distributionss and s2 are calculated Usingthe unconstrained
functions if the estimated
s1 is less than L and by the
constrained functions ifS1 is greater than L. Thisprocedure
does not require thatthe coefficientson variables used to
predict a and b beunbiased in the usualsense, only that the
predictions of a and bthemselves be unbiased.But it does assume
that the decision
function accurately fitsindividual choices.
And the extrapolations
of individual choiceswhen the limit is
raised depend on theassumed distribution of thedisturbance terms
e1 and e2. Checks on these
assumptions can only be basedon how
well the estimated
specification fits the observeddata points and
we will demonstrate that.
Using the panel of independent
cross—sections that the data
provide, however, we alsopresent alternative__and inthis case
on the effect of IRAson saving. If IRks
were not available, L =0,this specificationpredicts that the
proportion of the marginaldollar of income devotedto saving--in—16—
the S2 form only--Would be
(l-a)b/(lab). To theextent that the
model is accurate, thisestimated marginal saving rateshould be
matched by the estimated marginalrate of non-IRA, s2, saving
prior to the availabilityof IRAs. With caveatsto be explained,
such a marginal rate canbe obtained by estimatingthe constrained
S2 equation using1980 and 1981 data, priorto the general
availability of IRA5. Inaddition, the complete modelwill be
estimated separately for thefirst and second years ofthe general
availability of IRAs, allowingcomparison of estimateddesired
levels of saving, summarized byb, as knowledge aboutIRAS
apparently spread andtheir use increased, as shownin table 2.
B.The Estimated SpecifiCatQfl
We concentrate on the potential
substitution between IRAs and
other liquid financial assetsaving, assuming thatin the short
run at least IRA5 areunlikely to be substitutedfor non-liquid
wealth like housing.aintaifling the prior definitions,the
current budget constraint
is expanded to include taxesT before
saving, the price P1 =1-tof IRA saving in termsof current
consumption, and the price P2=1of other saving in termsof




11In principle, the marginal taxrate is determined in part
by IRA contributions.But since the IRA limitsnarrowly restrict
this influence, we treat t as exogenous.—17—
At times Y -Tis denoted by Desired but not observeds1 and
desired as well as observeds2 are allowed to be negative. In
addition, the potential substitution betweenS1 and S2 is allowed
to be quite flexible and distinctfrom the substitution between
either form of saving and currentconsumption. Given current
income, a decision function with thesecharacteristics is
(4) V =fC]b{[a(Sl_a1)k+(1—a)(S2_a2)k]1/k)b
This function has a tree structurewith one branch current
expenditure and the other saving. These twocomponents are
evaluated in a Cobb—Douglas manner withpreference parameter b.
The two forms of saving are evaluatedaccording to a constant
elasticity of substitution subfunction.12 Theparameter a
indicates the relative preferencefor S1 versus S2; if a =.5,
total saving is splitequally between the two forms. The
elasticity of substitution betweenS1 and 2 is 1/(1-k). The
important feature of this functionalform is that it allows
greater substitution between the two formsof saving than between
either of these and currentconsumption.
It also allows the IRA advantageto be reflected first in a
lower cost of saving in terms ofcurrent income, through the
current budget constraint, and in additionthrough different
12This specificationturns out to be a variant of the "S—
branch" utility tree describedby Brown and Heien [1972). See
also Sato [1967] and Blackorby,Boyce, and Russell [1978].—18—
preferences for the two assets,possibly reflecting the different
rates of return. Although theillustrations in section I-A show
that the distinction betweencurrent cost and return may be an
artificial one in strict economicterms--that the ultimate
difference is one of yield only——Consumers mayunderstand better,
and be influenced to a greater extent,by the current tax saving
than by the tax free compoundingof interest, certainly the
promotion of IRAs has tended tohighlight the former. In
practice, it is not possibleto distinguish the quantitative
effect of one from that of the other.Indeed, in practice it is
not possible to distinguish with anyprecision the effect of the
tax rate from the effect of othervariables, income in particular.
Nonetheless, both features of IRAs, aswell as any effects of
advertising or the contract—like natureof iRA saving provisions,
are allowed to determineindividual choices.
Maximization of (4) subject to the budgetconstraint yields
unconstrained desired levels of S1 and S2
S1 =a1+d1(Y—P1a1—P2a2)
S2 =a2+d2(YT_Plal_P2a2)





In addition to saving behaviorunder the model as described,two
limiting versions of this specificationare of special interest.
They are considered first.
1.Ifk=o.
The limiting case of (4)as k goes to 0 is a much simpler
model than the generalone and is much easier to estimate.In
fact, the estimated value of k isclose to zero and forsimplicity
many of the results are describedassuming that it is zero. This







and observed levels by13
1-3Although it is illegal toborrow against an IRA, fundscan be withdrawn subject to the10 percent penalty. But since















a2 +(l_ab)P2[T122 if L <S1
This specification is easily comparedwith the illustration in the
previous section.
2. If k =1and a =.5.
Under this assumption, the elasticityof substitution between
and 2 is infinite and they are given equalweight in the
preference function; they are perfectsubstitutes and are treated
as a single asset. Thedecision function (4) becomes
(8) V =[C]-[Sl+S2
—
Becausethe price of iRA saving is lower,saving is only through—21—




—P1(a1+a2)j if 0 <S1<L
1
L ifL<s1 (9)
1 0 ifS1<L =)
b
(a1+a—L) + - P1L—P2(a1+a2—Lflif L <S1 2
In this case, the IRA tax advantagesimply creates a kink in the
intertemporal budget constraint describing therelationship
between foregone current consumption andfuture consumption, and
inframarginal arguments could be used torepresent the incentive
effects of IRAs on persons who would in theirabsence save more
than the IRA limit. This possibility isclearly rejected by the
data, however.
3.Other values of k
Unlike the k =0or k =1cases, there is no closed form
solution to the constraineds2 function for other values of k. In
this case, the constrainedfunctions, S2*(O) when S <0and




where m is either 0 or L. It is derived by maximizing (4) subject
to the budget constraint and with the additionalconstraint that
S1 =m.The observed levels of saving are
0 ifS1<0
S1=a1+dl(YT—Plal—P2a2) if 0 <S1<L
.;Fr. -
(11)
S2*(O) if S1 <0
S2=a2+d2(YT_Plal—P2a2) if 0 <S1<0
S2*(L) if L <S1.
C. Parameterization of a and b and Stochastic Specification
To capture the wide variation in saving behavior among
individuals, a and b are allowed to depend on individual





where F[j is the standard normal distribution function and aand
are vectors of parameters.
Finally, we allow the S1 and S2 functions to beshifted by
additive disturbances e1 and e2 respectively. A random preference—23—
stochastic specification thatmakes each individual'schoices
formally consistent with thedecision function (4) isobtained if
a1 and a2 are assumed to be random, withadditive disturbances.
This specification isnot tractable, however,when S2 must be
solved for implicitly.Experience with both forms inVent! and
Wise [1986a, 1986b) showsthat the results are notappreciably
affected by this choice.The disturbances areassumed to be
distributed bivariatenormal with standard deviations
c1 and c2
respectively and correlation r. Thedisturbance term for the
constrained S2 equation isobtained as described forthe
illustration in section Aabove and is denotedby e2*.
There are three Possibilitiesfor the observed valuesof
S1: 0, between o and L, and L.In principle, acontinuously
measured value of S2 is availablefor each person,yielding three
possible joint outcomes foreach observation. Inpractice,
however, about 40 Percent ofthe sample reports nonon—IRA saving,
apparently reporting small changesas zero. Thus there isa large
concentration of observationsat zero, which is inconsistentwith
the normalityassumption. To reflect the factthat some of the
reported zeros are in factPositive and othersnegative, we
randomly assign them categoricalvalues, positive or negative.
This yields threePossible outcomes forS2: the reported non—zero
value, less than zero, orgreater than zero. Thus foreach of the
three possibles1 outcomes, there are three possible
s2 outcomes,
or nine Possibilities in all.Each of the associated—24—
probabilities is describedin the appendix. Estimation,based on
these probabilities, is bymaximum likelihood.
iii. Results
A. The Data
The definitions of the variablesused in the analysis,
together with summarystatistics, are reported in table5. only a
few need further explanation.The results reported here arebased
on a definition of othersaving S2 that excludes stocksand bonds.
Results with other saving definedto include stocks and bonds are
virtually the same.14
The variable indicating whether a personhas a private
pension plan is based on the responseto a question that asks
whether any employer or union
"contribute(d)" in the past 12
months to a pension plan inwhich the respondent was enrolled.
Only 39 percent answered yes.Other sources indicate that over50
percent of employees arecovered by private pension plans.
Apparently many respondentswho were in fact covered by a plan
141t is not possible to include changesin consumer debt in
non-IRA saving. Although itis illegal to borrow against an IRA,
for some persons it would be possibleto fund an iRA contribution
indirectly by increasing consumerdebt. Based on the median
levels of debt in each of the CESquarterly surveys, however, we
believe that increases in debtcould not explain the results
reported below. The mediansof "total amount owed excludingauto
and mortgage loans" for 1980, 81, 82,and 83 were $552, $564,
$336, and $400 respectively.The median in the first quarterof
1984 was $400. Thus if anything,consumer debt declined overthis
period.—25—
indicated that there was noemployer contribution. Under the
typical defined benefit plan, contributionsto pension funds are
not associated with individualworkers, and some respondents in
such cases may have been unaware ofthe employer contribution.
Others may be covered by definedcontribution plans with no
employer contribution.
As mentioned above, although theCESs provide data on home
and property values, and onconsumer debt, the public use files do
not report the amount of homemortgages. Thus it is not possible
to obtain an accurate measure ofnon—liquid wealth. In its place,
we use non—liquid assets--defined to includehome and property
values, plus stocks and bonds, minusconsumer debt——and a variable
indicating whether the respondent ownsa home but has no mortgage.
There is no measure for SocialSecurity or private pension wealth.
B Parameter Esi-imates
Results are reported for three timeperiods: (1) 1983:2 to
1984:1, the second year that IRAs were availableto all employees;
(2) 1982:1 to 1983:1, the firstyear of general availability; and
(3) 1980:1 to 1981:4, before IRAswere generally available.15
15Respondents were asked how muchthey contributed to an IRA
account during the past 12 months. Contributionsfor a given tax year can be made until April 15 of thefollowing year, or, the entire contribution for ayear can be made on January 1 of that
year. Thus part of the contribution reported insurveys conducted after 1982 could have been for theprior tax year and part for the
current tax year. No matter what thesurvey quarter, however, the
non—IRA saving always corresponds to thesame 12 month period as
the IRA contribution, which could ofcourse be zero.—26—
The key parameters in determining the effect of a limit
change on saving are a, b, and k, together with the origin
parameters and the residual variances. Thesubstitution parameter
k is the most difficult to estimate. Given the potential for the
other parameters to adjust to fit the data as k varies, the
likelihood function is quite flat with respect to k. The
estimated value is always close to zero, however, and often
slightly negative, indicating an elasticity ofsubstitution
between S1 and S2 of about 1.
Results with C1setequal to c2, are shown in appendix table
1 (for the 1983:2 to 1984:1 period). In this case, theestimated
value of k is —0.15, with a standard error of 0.06. Estimates
with c1 again set equal to c2, but with k set to zero, are shown
in appendix table 2. These results are virtually the same as
those with k estimated. There would appear to be no appreciable
effect from assuming k =0instead of the small estimated value.
Simulations based on the two sets of estimates confirm this. Thus
the results discussed below were obtained setting k equal to zero.
The other parameters are affected somewhat, however, by
allowing the residual variances for the two equations to be
different. The estimated variances are different and both are
quite precisely measured.16 Results with separately estimated
variances but with k set to zero are shown in table 6. We take
16And, allowing the disturbance variances to be different
changes somewhat the estimated slope parameters, primarilybecause
of the tradeoff between the two when fitting the data subject to
the IRAlimits.—27—
these estimates as a baseand discuss them first.
1.1983:2 to l984J
The estimated correlationcoefficient is essentiallyzero,
.01, indicating thatunmeasured determinants of IRAand non-Ipx
saving are unrelated. Inparticular, it is not thecase that,
given measured attributesX, persons who make IRAcontributions
save less in other financialasset forms.
The averages of thepredicted values of a and bprovide a
summary of the results. Recall thatb is the proportion ofthe
marginal dollar of after taxincome that individualswould like to
allocate to financial assetsaving, both IRA and non-Ip.The
proportion of this amount directed
to IRA saving is a. It is
important to keep in mindwhen interpreting theseparameters that
they represent rates of increasein the desiredsaving functions.
Because of the negative
origin parameters, desiredsaving is
negative for a large portionof the sample and actualsaving zero
or negative, and this wouldstill be true afteran increase in
income. And, the IRA limitrestricts the realized effectof an
income increase on IRAsaving. Thus these marginalrates are not
comparable to estimated marginalsaving rates where there areno
limit constraintsor where the limits have notbeen accounted for
in estimation. Wecall them latent increasesto distinguish them
from actual realized dollar
increases in saving with income
increases, the usual meaning ofmarginal saving rates.
The mean of the estimatedtotal financial assetmarginal
saving rates is .206. The vastmajority of this amount, 92.8—28—
percent, would be allocatedto IRAs. Thus there is a strong
preference for IRA versusnon—IRA saving. The latent increasein
non—IRA saving with a dollar increasein after tax income is only
1.5 cents, indicated by d2, the meanestimated value of ab. The
latent increase in after tax incomedevoted to IRA saving is
ab/(l-t)the price of an iRA dollaris less than 1--about 24.6
cents averaged over the sample. Theseestimates are consistent
with the observation that many IRAcontributors had accumulated
very little in non—IRAfinancial assets, and more generallywith
the finding that a large proportionof respondents had essentially
no saving at all, other thanhousing.
The results are virtually the sameif stocks and bonds are
included in the definition of S2.17Estimates were also obtained
under the assumption that some respondentsincluded IRA balances
with bank saving accounts and otherassets used to determine S2,
with little effect on the centralconclusions.18
17In this case, the estimated b is .176, a is .906, ris
—.01, C1 is 5.91, c2 is 3.52, a1is —14.49, and a2 is —.06.
3-8The key questions used in the analysis are reproducedin
footnote 5. Although it seems unlikelyto us that the typical
respondent would have included"...self-emplOyed retirement plan
such as Individual Retirement Account•.." with "Savings accounts
in banks, •..," some may have confusedthe two. A simple check
shows that almost a third of the respondentsmade IRA
contributions that were greater thantheir reported other saving
balances. In these cases, the IRA wasclearly not included with
other saving, Of persons who reportedbeginning of year other
saving balances less than their reportedIRA contribution——those
who would be most likely to have IRAcontributions greater than
end of year other saving balances--almost70 percent reported
year—end other saving balancesless than their IR contributions.
obviously, this group did not confusethe two. (The 70 percent
would not be expected to be 100 percentbecause persons who make
IRA contributions are also likelyto save in other forms as well.)
Finally, we assumed that 20 percentof those who had year—end
saving balances greater thantheir reported IRA contributionsdid—29—
If the two forms of saving are close substitutes, the
proportion of marginal income devoted toS2 saving should increase
when the IRA limit is reached. Evidence on thisquestion is
provided by estimated values of this proportion for familiesat
the IRA limit, before and after the limit isreached, d2 and d2*.
If there were no limit, these families wouldon average increase
non—IRA saving by 3.3 cents with a dollar increase in income.
After the IRA limit is reached, a dollar increase in income is
associated with an increase of 4.6 cents in non—IRAsaving. The
difference of 1.3 cents is very small relative to theiraverage
latent marginal propensity to save in the IRAform, 33.3 cents.
For comparison with estimates for years prior to the
availability of IRAs, we consider the marginal effect of incomeon
saving that is implied by these estimates, if there wereno IRAs,
that is, if the limit were 0. From equation(7) above, the
marginal effect in this case is (1 -a)b/(l-ab).Its mean over
persons in the sample, based on the parameter estimates in table
6, is .015. A dollar increase in after tax income would be
include the IRA with other saving balances. Thekey parameter
estimates were changed very little; the principle effectwas to
reduce somewhat the mean estimatedS2 saving. The analysis in
Venti and Wise [1986bJ, based on the SCF in which the
interpretation of the other saving response was much more
ambiguous than in the CESs, was done using both interpretations
for all respondents. Considerable sensitivityanalysis based on
the two interpretations of the responses to thekey questions, as
well as other assumptions, is reported there.—30—
associated with an increase of less than 2 cents in financial
asset saving.19
Finally, the relationship of individual attributes to the
predicted values of a and b are of some interest, although the
associated coefficients should not be assigned a behavioral
interpretation. Families who have in the past accumulated more
liquid financial assets are indeed more likely than others to
continue saving more in this form, as indicated by the positive
coefficient in the b equation, but liquid assets are in fact
negatively related to the proportion allocated to IRAs. Total
desired saving, as well as the desired proportion in IRAs, are
larger for older persons. The more highly educated also have a
greater propensity to save, suggesting that saving behavior varies
widely in the population, as others have found.2° Larger families
save less.
2. 1982:1 to 1983:1
Comparable estimates to those in table 6, but for the first
year that IRAs were generally available, are shown in appendix
table 3. The important difference between the two sets of
estimates is that estimated desired marginal IRA saving increased
from the earlier to the later period, apparently reflecting
19Although small, the estimate does not seem unrealistic
compared to the aggregate personal saving rate based on national
accounts, which is in the range of 5 percent. And a large portion
of this amount is in company pension plans, that are not included
in the analysis here.
20See, for example, the survey of King [1985].increasing awareness of IRAs and their advantages. The estimated
total latent marginal saving rate in the earlier period isonly
.120 compared to .206 in the later period; the estimated
proportion allocated to IRAs is about the same in the two periods,
.888 versus .928.
3. 1980:1 to 1981:4
Before 1982 only persons without private pension plans could
contribute to IRAs and the limit was lower. Only about 3percent
of the CES respondents contributed in 1980 and 1981. As mentioned
above, the model estimated for the later years provides estimates
of implied saving behavior were IRAs not available. Othersaving
S2 is given by the constrained saving function in equation (7),
with the limit L set to zero. In particular, marginalsaving is
given by (l-a)b/(l-ab), with a mean of .015.
To check this prediction, a comparable estimate can be
obtained directly from the data for the pre-1982years. The only
hindrance to exact comparability is that the earlier data do not
report whether a person had a private pension plan and was thus
ineligible for an IRA in these years. It is clear from the
summary data, however, that IRAs were essentially unused and quite
possibly most people who could have taken advantage of them were
unaware of their availability. Certainly they were not widely
advertised, as they were beginning in 1982. Thus we have
estimated the constrained S2 function for the 1981-1982 period,—32—
assuming that the IRA option was not available atall.2' Because
there is only one equation to estimate, it is not possible to
estimate both a and b as functions of X; instead the marginal term
(l-a)b/(l-ab) is estimated as a single function of X. The results
are shown in table 7. The mean of the predicted marginal saving
terms is .013, compared to .015, the value implied by the full
model. Both of these estimates are consistent with the very low
levels of financial asset balances reported above and with the low
levels of total personal saving, currently in the 4 to 5 percent
range, most of which is comprised of contributions to employer
pension plans.22
These very low estimates compared to the much larger total
marginal saving term for the later period (b =.206)also suggest
that the IRA saving was not simply replacing other personal
financial asset saving, of which there was very little. If this
were the case, one would expect to see a relationship between
income and saving in this early period that approximates the
relationship for total saving in the post IRA period. It is clear
that IRA saving in the later period does not show up as non-IRA
financial asset saving in the pre-IPA period. Apparently desired
saving was much higher in the later period. The results are
summarized in the tabulation below:
21-The few persons who made contributions in those years were
deleted from the sample.
22See for example Bernheim and Shoven [1987].—33—
(l—a)b Time Period k
(1—ab)
1. 1983:2—1984:1 .206 .928—15.92—.30 .015
2. 1982:1—1983:1 .120 .888 —9.68—.27 .015
3. 1980.1—1981:4 —— —.28 .013
Not only are the implied non IRA marginal savings rates based on
the estimated model virtually the same as the actual observed
rates prior to IRA availability, but the estimated intercept terms
a2 are essentially the same as well. According to these
estimates, total desired marginal financial saving increased from
.013 in the pre IRA period to .120 in the first year after their
introduction, to .206 the following year.23
C.The Model Fit
Predicted versus actual percents of the sample with S1 saving
greater than 0 and at L are shown in table 8, together with the
percents with positive S2 saving. In general, the predicted
values match the actual values very closely by income interval.24
23The estimated intercept in the IRA equation, a1is much
lower in the first than in the second period, but the efror
variance is higher in the first period as well, 5.82 versus 3.86.
24To obtain the actual S2 values, the values reported at zero
were randomly assigned to be positive or negative. The percents
actually reported to be greater than zero ranged from 22 percent
in the lowest income interval to 47 percent in the highest,
compared with the range from 47 to 69 after random assignment of
zeros.—34—
In particular, the conditional percents with positive S2 saving,
for persons who are at the IRA limits of 0 and L, are close to the
actual values. If anything, the model overpredicts positive S2
saving among persons at the IRA limit. If the model were not
adequately capturing actual substitution between S1 and S2, it
should underpredict non-IRA saving by those who exceed the IRA
limit. 25
D. Simulations of the Saving Effect of Proposed and Adopted
Legislation
For comparison, the effects of two plans are simulated. The
first is the so—called Treasury I proposal of November 1984 (U.S.
Department of Treasury, 1984) and the second is the recently
adopted 1986 tax reform legislation. The early proposal was to
increase the limit for an employed person from $2000 to $2500 and
the limit for the spouse of an employed person from $250 to $2500.
The new legislation maintains the previous provisions for persons
25The predicted versus actual average dollar amounts of S
saving are $348 and $366 respectively; S2 values are $261 versus
$226. For persons with S1= L,the S2 values are $1670 versus
$1873. For those with s1 =0,the S2 values are $82 versus —$6.
In some cases, the average dollar amounts are affected
substantially by extreme values of S2 saving. We therefore
eliminated the top 5% and the bottom 5% of the reported S2 values
and reestlinated the parameters in table 6. The estimated
parameters change very little. For example, b is .189 instead of
.206 and a is .964 instead of .928. As expected, the estimated
residual variances are smaller; c1 is 4.97 versus 5.82 and c2 is
1.53 versus 3.09. In this case, the predicted and actual average
S1 savings are $262 versus $272 and S2 $188 versus $153. For
those with s1 =L,the S2 values are $552 versus $335. For those
with s1 =0,the S2 values are $152 versus $121.—35—
without a private pension plan. For persons covered by a private
pension, it phases out the tax deduction of contributions by
single person at incomes between $25,000 and $35,000 and for
families filing joint returns at incomes between $40,000 and
$50,000. Returns continue to accrue tax free.
The initial simulations indicate what would have happened,
according to the model estimates, had these plans been in effect
during the period of estimation, 1983:2 to 1984:1. Simulation of
the effects of the first plan is straightforward. The second is
more complicated for two reasons. First, it depends on private
pension plan coverage, which is apparently underreported in the
CESs, as explained above. Second, for the approximately 10
percent of the tax filers who have private pensions and higher
incomes it eliminates the current tax deduction but not the tax—
free compounding of returns.
Our model specification incorporates the contribution tax
deduction in the budget constraint, in line with the promotion of
IRAs. The specification also recognizes that the IRA should be
preferred because the return accrues tax free. It does this by
letting the preference parameter a in particular, as well as b,
depend on income, age, and other individual attributes. The
estimated coefficients on these attributes capture not only the
direct effects of the attributes themselves but alsoany effect of
the marginal tax rate, which, during the period of estimation,
should be predicted well by these personal attributes. The
marginal tax rate determines the relative return advantage of the—36—
IRA over a conventional account. But we found that it was not
possible to identify with any confidence the marginal tax rate
effect itself, in particular, as distinct from the effect of
income. The estimated effect is very sensitive to the
specification, especially the way that income enters the model.
Similar results are reported in Wise [1984 and 1985] and in Venti
and Wise [1985). King and Leape [1984) report little effect of
the marginal tax rate on asset choice.
Thus while we have considerable confidence in the simulated
effects of the limit increase proposal, the estimated effects of
the current legislation may be less accurate. We have simply
phased out the lower price, 1 —t,for persons with private
pensions and with incomes above the appropriate limits.26 To the
extent that pension coverage is underreported in the CESs, the
contribution reduction is underestimated. Simulations using the
new tax rates in the budget constraint were also performed, but
since the new rates have little effect overall the results are not
reported here.27
26The IRA price is assumed to be 1 -tat $40,000 and to move
linearly to 1 at $50,000 for married persons filing joint returns,
and similarly for single persons with incomes between $25,000 and
$35, 000.
271n this case, to the extent that the separate effect of the
greater IRA return is important in determining the greater
preference for them, it is not accurately reflected in the
preference parameters since the relationship between tax rates and
other parameters such as income has changed.—37—
The simulated effects of theTreasury proposal and of the new
law are shown in table 9. Predictedsaving under the current plan
is taken as a base forcomparison. The Treasury plan would have
increased iRA saving by 31percent, with almost no reduction in
other saving. Persons at thecurrent limit would have increased
their contributions by about 43percent. The simulated changes in
consumption, taxes, and other saving associatedwith the IRA
increase are as follows:
Amount Percent
Change in IRA saving +$1l99 100.0
Change in other saving -37 -3.1
Change in consumption -793 —66.1
Change in taxes -367 —30.8
By these estimates, almost two-thirds of theincrease in IRA
saving is funded by reduced consumptionand about one—third by
reduced taxes28 If stocks and bondsare included in S2, the
reduction in other saving is 5.7percent, consumption is reduced
by 64.6 percent, and taxes by 29.7percent.
The new law will reduce contributionsby an estimated 13
percent. The decrease is Concentratedamong families with incomes
of $40,000 and above. If it isassumed that the reported pension
coverage in the CES is correct for persons with incomesabove this
level ($25,000 for singlepersons), an upper bound on the
28Very similar estimatesare obtained using the parameters
reported in appendix table 1, in which theelasticity parameter k was estimated, but the residual varianceswere constrained to be the same.—38—
reduction can be obtained by assuming that the upperincome
families cannot contribute at all to IRAs if they have a private
pension plan. Under this assumption, thereduction is 19 percent.
With greater pension coverage than the CES reports, more persons
would be restricted by the new law and both of theseestimates
would be somewhat larger. None of the simulated effectsis
changed much if marginal tax rates from the newbill are assumed.
IV. Summary and Discussion
The evidence presented here suggests that the vast majority
of IRA saving represents net new saving, not accompanied by a
reduction in other financial asset saving. Thus increasesin the
IRA limits such as those proposed in the November 1984 Treasury
plan would lead to substantial increasesin IRA saving and very
little reduction in other saving. If the IRA limit were raised,
about two-thirds of the increase in IRA saving would be funded by
a decrease in current consumption and aboutone—third by reduced
taxes; only a very small proportion would come from other saving.
These conclusions are supported both by descriptive data and by
the formal statistical analysis developed in the paper.
Tabulations from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys show that:
—Thesharp increase in IRA contributions beginningin 1983
was not accompanied by a reduction in other formsof
financial asset saving.
—Thefinancial asset holdings of 1982 and 1983 IRA
contributors were much lower than would have been accumulated
had prior saving been even a fraction of the typical IRA
contribution.—39—
—IRAcontributors are much more likely than non-contributors
to save in other forms, suggesting that thelarger
accumulated financial asset balances of contributorsreflect
this greater saving propensity.
The formal analysis indicates that:
—Individualsshow a strong preference for IRA versus other
forms of saving.
—Controllingfor individual attributes like age and income,
there is essentially no correlation between IRA contributions
and other financial asset saving.
—Theres very little substitution of IRA for other
financial asset saving, consistent with the observationthat
most potential contributors and a large proportion ofactual
contributors had been saving very little before theadvent of IRAs.
The model, estimated on post-IRA data, predicts wellthe
actual relationship between income and financial assetsaving
prior to the advent of IRAs. In particular, saving inIRA
accounts does not show up as other financial assetsaving prior to
the general availability of IRAs. The cross-sectionresults for
the 1983:2 to 1984:1 period correspondvery closely to results
based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.29
The analysis, however, does not rule out thelong run
substitution of IRAs for non-liquid assets,housing in particular.
Our implicit measure of current consumption includesexpenditures
on housing and other durables. While we believe that there is
little possibility for substitution in the shortrun and thus
little effect on the results here, the substitutionpossibilities
are greater over time.
29See Venti and Wise(1986a,1986b].—40—
The statistical analysis accounts for the important effects
of the IRA limits and for the effect of the IRA constraint on non-
IRA saving. In addition, it allows for flexible substitution
between IRA and other financial saving. The model also allows the
two forms of saving to be treated by individuals as distinct
goods, but also allows the data to reveal them to be equally
preferred and treated as perfect substitutes. Inthis case, the
IRA saving of a small proportion of contributors might be thought
of theoretically as inframarginal and thus having no new saving
effect. The data, however, strongly reject this view. One
explanation for this is simply that individuals think of IRA
contributions as saving for retirement and distinct from other
saving that might be intended for more short term purposes.And
the intensive promotion of IRAs may have greatly increased the
allocation of current income to them and thus the strong
preference for them that is revealed by the data.Indeed the
strong advertising of IRAs may have reshaped to someextent public
attitudes toward saving for retirement. In this sense, it may be
that an IRA, much like life insurance, is sold notbought.3°
Although the tax advantage of IRAs is surely part of the
explanation for their popularity, the net saving effect that
accompanies IRA contributions invites alternative explanationsfor
their growth.
30Such an argument was recently suggested by Summers [1985].—41—
Saving schemes like IRAs have been available in Canada since
1956 and were greatly expanded and promoted in the early 1970's.
It was at this time that personal saving rates in the U.S. and
Canada, which until that time had been very similar, diverged,
with substantially higher rates in Canada thereafter.Large
increases in Registered Retirement Saving Plan limits arenow
contemplated in Canada. The United Kingdom has recently
established two new tax—deferred saving programs. One, the
Personal Pension Plan is directly patterned after the U.S. IRA,
but is billed as a substitute for firm pension plans. The other,
the Personal Equity Plan, has tax advantages equivalent to the
IRA, but limited to and intended to encourage more widespread
individual investment in the stock market. Similar plans are
available in France and Belgium. Both are reported to have had
substantial net saving effects, but we have seen no formal
analysis of this.Table 1
Table 1. Percent with an IRA and Percent of All Contributors














0—10 2.3 5.4 4.3 5.7
1r_)r ic A Al Q
20—30 7.8 17.2 14.3 19.7
30—40 13.7 21.7 20.5 17.1
40—50 20.5 14.9 34.2 19.8
50—100 25.7 24.1 46.8 24.6
100+ 50.7 1.7 57.5 3.7
All 9.8 100.0 16.4 100.0Table 2. IRA Contributions and Changes in Other
















1980:1 75 .050 .262 .270
2 48 .029 .290 .277
3 42 .030 .309 .283
4 33 .020 .299 .264
1981:1 30 .031 .278 .253
2 59 .038 .277 .258
3 28 .019 .293 .289
4 56 .036 .248 .221
1982:1 89 .050 .320 .308
2 145 .105 .321 .304
3 192 .113 .314 .291
4 237 .116 .313 .287
1983:1 187 .107 .25]. .222
2 465 .189 .317 .278
3 362 .172 .337 .310
4 333 .159 .285 .258
1984:1 344 .140 .299 .284Table 3
Table 3. Percent of Families with Increase in Financial Assets













0—10 16.9 11.9 18.2 12.2
10—20 39.8 23.3 47.8 23.9
20—30 30.1 30.9 39.7 32.8
30—40 58.6 36.1 60.8 39.3
40—50 41.7 38.9 53]_ 44.1
50—100 43.2 39.9 53.3 43.2
100+ 57.1 30.9 72.6 45.3
All 41.9 26.2 50.1 27.8Table 4
Table 4. Median Liquid Assets ofFamilies, by IRA
Contributor Status, 1982:1 to 1984:1
Income Excluding Stocks and Bonds Including Stocks andBonds Interval IRA Con—Noncon— IRA Con-Noncon- ($l000's)Alltributortributor Alltributortributor
0—10 85 3050 69 85 5200 69
10—20 391 2850 347 400 4563 350
20—30 1096 4225 1000 1287 5400 1050
30—40 2500 8020 1900 3250 14415 2500
40—50 3438 6500 3000 5277 11874 3850
50—100 6000 10500 4924 8967 19950 6000
100+ 10600 13500 3100 15856 25000 5600
All 1000 6000 797 1125 11000 812Tab]e 5
Table 5. Variable Definitions and SummaryStatistics
for 1983:2 to 1984:1
Standard
Deviation Variable Definition Mean
Age Age in years 37.9 11.7
Income After-tax family income 24.4 16.0
in $l,000's
Unmarried One if single; zero otherwise 0.34 0.47
Education Years of education 13.2 3.3
Family size Number of persons in family 3.0 1.6
Liquid assets Dollar value of U.S. savings 4.9 11.3
bonds, savings accounts,
checking accounts, brokerage
accounts, and other similar
accounts, in $].,000's.
Nonliquid Sum of value of homes 35.3 51.9
assets property and stocks and
bonds minus consumer debt,
in $1,000's.
No mortgage One if family owns home and 0.09 0.28
has no mortgage; zero
otherwise
Pension One if family is covered by 0.39 0.49
pension; zero otherwiseTable 6. Parameter Estimates with k =0,1983:2 to 1984:1
Table 6



































No Mortgage .0730(.0439) —.4225(.1059)
Pension .0281(.0254) .1037(.0613)
Family Size —.0372(.0102) —.0291(.0219)





Mean d2 =0.015Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Non—IRA Saving Prior












































Table 8. Predicted versus Actual Values, by Income Interval












0—10 294 4 2 2 1 47 51
10—20 574 8 8 3 4 49 54
20—30 472 16 16 8 8 51 54
30—40 274 27 30 15 16 55 55
40—50 134 34 30 20 16 58 57
u-r jq' 'èø i o ou











pe Ad pC Ad
0—10 5 54 50 283 46 51
10—20 20 53 48 531 48 54
20—30 39 57 59 398 50 53
30—40 40 63 60 199 54 53
40—50 27 64 45 85 56 59
50+ 36 74 69 72 65 57
TOTAL 168 63 58 1571 50 54
a. Based on 50 draws per sample observation. P is predicted,
and A is actual.
b. T in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted s2 >0,given predicted s =L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted s2 >0,given predicted i <0.Table 9. Simulated Responses to Alternative Schemes
















Avg. contribution 351 274 459 270 306 274
% change ---- +31 -1 -13 0
Families at IRA Limit*
Avg. contribution27541647 3953 1611 24381659
% change -— -— +43 -2 -11 0
By Income Interval
($1, 000s)
0—10 50 —213 60 —214 50—213
10—20 123 — 54 151 — 54 123— 54
20—30 309 145 402 143 306 145
30—40 633 480 822 474 617480
40—50 833 874 1151 867 683875
50+ 10902326 1486 2311 6682337
*Families predicted to be at the limit under the previous law.References
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Appendix on Estimation
We adopt a stochastic specification that allows additive
disturbances e1 and e2 associated with S1 and S2 respectively.
They are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal within
standard deviations c1 and c2 and correlation r. The joint
distribution of S1 and S2* is the relevant distribution if IRA
contributions are either zero or at the upper limit. The
disturbance associated with S2*, denoted by e2*, is a linear
function of e1 and e2 so the joint distribution of S1 and S2* is
also bivariate normal. Derivation of e2* and the covariance
paramenters (c2* and r*) of the joint S1, S2* distribution is
straightforward, but tedious.
There are nine possible outcomes. Define S1 =S1+
=2+ e2, and S2* =S2*+ e2*. With f the unit normal density
function ,Fthe corresponding distribution function, and F2 the
bivariate distribution function, the probabilities associated with
each outcome are given by:
1. s1 =0and S2 observed
P1 =(1/c2)f(s2—S2*/c2*) {1_F[S1+r*(c1/c2*) (S2_52*)/(c1i1_r*2) ]Appendix Page 2




3. S1=Land S2 observed
P3 =(1/c2*)f((s2—2*)/c2*)F[(1—L+r* (c1/c2*)(S2_2*))/(c1/1_r*2)]
4. s1=OandS2>O
P4 =F2[-S1/c1, S2*/c2*; —r*)
5. S1 observed S2 >0





8.S1 observed and 2 <0
P8 =(1/c1)f((S1—1)/c1) x(1_F(2+r(c2/c1)(S1_1)/(c2/1_r2fl)Appendix Page 3
9. s1=LandS2<O
P9 =F2[—(L—S1)/c1,—S2*/c2*; —r*]
The likelihood function is the product of the P over the relevant
subsets of observations.Appendix Table 1
Appendix Table 1. Parameter Estimates with k Estimated and
C1 =C2, 1983:2to 1984:1
Variable Estimate (Asymptotic Standard Error)
Covariance terms:
c1 3.36 (0.05)
c2 3.36 (——) r 0.03 (0.02)




Determinants of b and a:
Income —.0052 (.0007) —.0116 (.0024
Age .0040 (.0011) .0239 (.0036
Unmarried .0583 (.0304) —.1640 (.0835
Education .0091 (.0043) .0366 (.0107
Liquid Assets .0119 (.0005) —.0141 (.0019
Nonliquid Assets —.0002 (.0002) .0007 (.0006
No Mortgage .0585 (.0380) —.1627 (.0801
Pension .0118 (.0226) .0658 (.0600
Family Size —.0247 (.0090) —.0622 (.0263











Number of observations =1872Appendix Table 2
Appendix Table 2. Parameter Estimates with k =0,and c1 =c2,
1983:2 to 1984:1








Determinants of b and a:
Income —.0067 (.0007) —.0106 (.0021)
Age .0057 (.0012) .0190 (.0040)
Unmarried .0633 (.0312) —.2093 (.0973)
Education .0124 (.0047) .0327 (.0141)
Liquid Assets .0108 (.0006) —.0132 (.0016)
Nonliquid Assets —.0000 (.0002) .0008 (.0006)
No Mortgage .0548 (.0376) —.1792 (.0855)
Pension .0458 (.0242) —.0210 (.0688)
Family Size —.0245 (.0087) —.0718 (.0318)











Number of observations =1872Appendix Table 3. Parameter Estimates with k =0,
1982:1 to 1983:1
Appendix Table 3







Determinants of b and a:



















Liquid Assets .0086(.0008) —.0174(.0026)
Nonliquid Assets .0007(.0003) .0004(.0009)
No Mortgage —.0219(.0442) .0716(.0935)
Pension .1185(.0242) —.4939(.1055)
Family Size —.0812(.0130) .1643(.0472)
Constant —1.4172(.1670) .7748(.3885)
Predicted over sample:
Mean b =
Meana =
Mean =
Meand2 =
0.120
0.888
0.136
0.015